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Over the past decade  forces of competition  and 
adverse  economic  conditions  --combined  with  regulatory 
forbearance  and the moral hazards  generated  thereby-- 
have  contributed  to severe erosion  of bank 
profitability  and a mounting  number  of insolvencies. 
At  least three  implications  of this  erosion  may be  \ 
identified.  First,  in response  to pressures  on capital 
and profits  bank business  strategies  have  begun 
emphasizing  contraction  and consolidation.  Second, 
barring  new elements  of weakness  afflicting  other 
suppliers  of financial  services  on which  banks  could 
capitalize,  the role of banks  in the  future  is likely 
to be reduced  further.  Third,  the extent  of this 
reduction  will hinge to a considerable  degree  on 
whether  new public policies  applying  to capital  and 
deposit  insurance  are imposed.  Life  support  policies 
will  not restore  the weak,  but will  impair  the 
competitive  viability  of those remaining  strong. 
The material  to follow is divided  into  four parts. 
The  first consists  of a brief  summary  of recent  bank 
performance.  The succeeding  sections  address  the three 
implications  introduced  above. B.  Recent  Bank Performance 
A bank  is a  vehicle  for the delivery  of financial 
services.  Banks and their  affiliates  are authorized 
to deliver  virtually  all  finance-related  services  (see 
Table  1).  These  services  are financial  in nature 
because  that specialization  has been  institutionalized 
in statute,  regulation,  and practice.  There  have  been 
few strategic  incentives  to extend  beyond  "financial" 
roles,  although  the definition  of financial  itself has 
been  expanding.  For example,  processing  and 
informational  applications  having  origins  in financial 
services  have developed  into separate  profit  centers. 
In the broad context  of transactions,  investment 
and  liquidity  vehicles,  fund raising,  insurance,  and 
fiduciary  activities  only two classes  of activities  are 
subject  to major proscriptions  by statute:  The 
underwriting  of life  (except credit  life), casualty, 
and  fidelity  insurance  and the sponsorship  and 
distribution  of open-end  mutual  funds.  Two  further 
caveats  to the powers  generalization  are warranted. 
First,  the execution  of certain  securities  powers  must 
be undertaken  in separate  subsidiaries  and limited  in 
amount;  and, second,  retail  deposit  collecting  is 
2 subject  to geographic  restraints--now  primarily 
interstate. 
Historically  banks were accorded  franchise  status 
implying  virtually  exclusive  business  license  covering 
several  functions.  The first may be characterized  as 
the bestowed  license:  Deposits  subject  to check,  funds 
transfer  and clearing  arrangements  with  direct  access 
-. 
to bank clearing  arrangements  and to the  clearing  and 
settlement  services  of the Federal Reserve,  borrowing 
from the Federal  Reserve,  and the application  of 
government  assurances  on deposits  and other 
liabilities.  A derivative  distinction  was  the ability 
to  link deposit  and payments  services  to other  services 
in order to achieve  scale and scope economies  of 
production  and distribution  (suppliers' perspective) 
and consumption  economies  (users' perspective). 
The value  of both the original  and derivative 
functions  has eroded  dramatically  because  of the 
introduction  and development  of substitutes.  These 
substitutes  were  facilitated  by information  technology 
available  to new entrants  as well as to barriers  to 
adaptiveness  on the part of the banks  themselves. 
Funding  cost disadvantages  have sustained  the erosion 
3 of bank positions  in intermediation,  especially  those 
involving  businesses.  As  is well  known,  non-interest- 
bearing  demand  deposits  have declined  almost  without 
interruption  over the past twenty  years  relative.to 
other  forms  of financial  instruments.  In 1970 demand 
deposits  constituted  77% of M, and 26% of M,.  In 1990, 
the  comparable  figures were  34% and 8 l/2%.  Similarly, 
the  share  of all deposits  (banks and thrifts  as well) 
in M, has  fallen  over this period  from 92% in 1970 to 
78%  in 1990. 
Though  not as extensive,  shares  of bank  asset 
markets  (i.e., positions  with  debtors)  have  also 
eroded.  Overall,  bank shares  of financial  assets  held 
by the  financial  sector dropped  from 31%  in 1982 to 26 
l/2%  in 1989.*  The bank share  of business  lending  has 
fallen  from  33% to 25% over the past  nine years,  and 
the drop  is even more severe  (from 26% to  17 l/2%)  if 
measures  are confined  to domestic  U.S.  banks.  Part  of 
this  decline  reflects  pricing  disadvantages  attaching 
*Source:  U.S. Department  of the Treasury,  Modernizina  the 
Financial  Svstem,  February  1991, Chapter  I, Table  7. 
4 to bank loans.  In addition, however, banks facilitated 
this development by promotion of "off-balance-sheet@' 
letters of credit and commitments. 
Another factor in the decline of share has been 
actions by banks to securitize and sell portions of 
asset holdings.  The securitization development has 
enhanced liquidity management.  It also has made asset 
\ 
markets--  even those of relatively small size--more 
sensitive to national pricing patterns. 
Until recently many banks increased their 
allocations to those credit sectors not yet subject to 
securitization--  that is, where information asymmetries 
were believed to exist.  Commercial real estate is a 
prime example.  Between 1982 and 1988, the volume of 
net commercial real estate lending by banks comprised 
32% of all bank net lending.  This ratio is almost 
three times the share of such holdings in portfolio 
(12%)  at the beginning of the period.  The overbuilding 
to which this lending contributed has in turn subjected 
banks concentrating in this activity to major earnings 
and capital problems. 
The dimensions of bank performance erosion are 
suggested by industry averages.  From the 1960s through 
5 the mid-1980s returns on equity for all banks averaged 
about 11% and asset returns about 74 basis points (see 
Table 2).  The past four years provide a different 
picture.  Specifically, over the period 1987-90 asset 
returns have averaged 49 basis points and returns on 
equity about 8%. 
The current condition of the larger banks (assets' 
over $10 billion)  --which account for 39% of all bank 
assets--  has been weaker still (on  -average). First, as 
shown in Table 2, the average return on assets for 
1987-90 was only 20 basis points.  Second, in 1989 and 
1990 one quarter of the large banks lost money and by 
the end of the period noncurrent loans were almost 4% 
of total assets.  Also at yearend 1990 (not shown in 
the table), several large banks reported common equity- 
to-asset ratios at or below 4%.  Many institutions-- 
especially those active in real estate and consumer 
finance--  face prospects that the weakness in the U.S. 
economy will cause further rises in the volume of 
problem loans.  In many areas of the country, 
especially the Northeast, but also sections of Florida 
and California, loan delinquencies; office vacancy 
rates, and personal bankruptcies all are continuing to 
6 rise.  Moreover, even after the onset of general 
recovery, elements of loan growth in these markets ,are 
likely to be unusually sluggish.  Third, reflecting 
uneven performance and.apprehension over future 
performance, stock prices for the larger banks relative 
to the S. C P. 500 have been.falling...almost.without 
interruption for the past five years.*  \ 
C.  Strategic Shifts in Bankinq 
Most of the new strategies undertaken by banks 
during the past decade fall into five categories.  As 
noted earlier, one of the most important is the 
application of securitization to a.  wide range of 
customer loan categories.  As capital constraints have 
become more binding, some of the intermediation 
function has been replaced by that of origination for 
distribution.  Loans may be syndicated immediately or-- 
especially if of smaller denomination--packaged and 
securitized.  Some of this activity--e.g., in 
residential mortgages  --has been shifted to nonbank 
affiliates within bank holding companies. 
*See  U.S.  Department of the Treasury, m.  cit., 
Chapter I, figure 9. 
7 A second strategy entails expanded product 
offerings to current customers.  On the business side, 
larger business-oriented banks have attained authority 
(generally in separate affiliates under so-called 
Section 20 approval) to engage in debt and equity 
underwriting, dealing, advisory functions, and 
syndications.  With a few exceptions--and bearing in , 
mind the cyclical pressures currently afflicting all 
firms engaging in these services--market penetration by 
banks has not been very high.  On the consumer side, 
constraints on insurance underwriting and mutual fund 
sponsorship have imposed severe limitations on bank 
efforts to enhance penetration of customer asset 
positions.  Some services, such as annuities and mutual 
funds, have been sold through banks acting as agents 
for others.  Problems with incentives  and service 
quality, however, have resulted in limited success. 
Where powers have been expanded--notably brokerage-- 
banks (and  holding company affiliates) have had little 
impact.  Overall, banks generally have not been able to 
develop and distribute product offerings to sustain 
positions with customers or to offset their declining 
competitive standing in many deposit and credit 
markets. 
8 A third development has been the use of the balance 
sheet on which to generate risk management services for 
others.  These include swaps, caps, futures, and 
options covering interest  rates, commodity prices, and 
currency prices.  In this, U.S. banks appear to have 
attained recognition for innovative pricing and product 
development.  \ 
A fourth strategy is greater rationalization of the 
operations base.  This involves two elements.  One is 
expansion in present and contiguous markets aimed at 
capturing efficiencies in marketing, distribution, and 
so-called back office costs.  Until recently this 
entailed a substantial amount of merger activity. 
Between 1983 and 1989, for example, an average of 15 
amalgamations per year were announced between banks (or 
bank holding companies) where each party had total 
assets of $1 billion or more.  The average sale price 
per transaction over the period approximated $325 
million.  In 1990, by contrast, the figures were 3 and 
$250 million, respectively.  The primary reason for 
this shift is great uncertainty in the valuation of 
loan portfolios.  Highly profitable, sound institutions 
justifiably fear contamination from acquisition 
prospects not enjoying similar standing.  Lately 
9 acquisitions of parts of failed banks and thrifts on a 
"cleann basis has attained greater importance in 
filling in market positions without exposure to serious 
asset valuation risk.  Another feature of the 
amalgamation process has been acquisitions of 
portfolios of credit card receivables and mortgage 
servicing.  Valuations are subject to less error than', 
with whole banks and operational integration is more 
-readily achieved.  The second element of operational 
change is popularly referred to as 180utsourcing.1'  It 
consists of shifting to separate entities (such as EDS) 
a variety of processing functions.  The attainment of 
greater processing efficiency would, of course, 
facilitate market expansion. 
Finally, a fifth strategy has entailed deliberate 
exit from specific product, customer, or geographic 
positions.  Several U.S. banks have closed branches in 
Europe and Asia.  Many banks have reduced commitments 
to corporate finance in general and business lending in 
particular.  Other tactics have included dispositions 
of within-market branches, entire bank affiliates, 
credit card businesses, investment-management 
functions, and mortgage banking.  In short, candidates 
10 for divestiture have been virtually as broad as the 
powers accorded to banks.  Given the severe pressures 
remaining on the banking system and the expectation 
that loan problems will get worse before they get 
better, cost-cutting and business exiting are likely to 
remain dominant strategic adjustments--for many banks 
acts required for survival.  An obstacle to such  , 
execution in the future may be the presence of 
unrecognized valuation losses or good will, the 
accounting recognition of which would reduce net 
contributions to capital. 
Further 
combination 
D.  Future Contraction 
bank contraction is likely because of the 
of sustained service capabilities of others 
and existing bank vulnerabilities.  Loan losses 
typically continue to rise even after the commencement 
of cyclical recovery.  Given higher debt service 
requirements of businesses and consumers relative to 
income, the coming recovery may well witness a more 
prolonged than usual debt correction. 
Assuming current economic dislocations will 
generate new requirements for loan.loss provisioning, 
11 many  banks  clearly  face the need  to enhance  their 
capital  positions.  The magnitudes  facing  many 
institutions  is illustrated  by a recent  Salomon 
Brothers  analysis  of money  center  banks.*  In that work 
Salomon  estimated  a capital  shortfall  by yearend  1992 
approximating  $8 l/2 billion.  Although  recourse  to 
outside  sources  cannot be ignored,  the  alternatives  ’ 
treated  in the Salomon review  are  internal 
adjustments --asset  reductions,  expense  cuts,  and 
elimination  of common  stock  dividends.  According  to 
Salomon,  reliance  on asset  shrinking  alone  would 
require  a 37% reduction;  only  on expenses,  31%; and 
eliminating  dividends  alone was  not  sufficient.  The 
formulation  lacks a feedback  mechanism--e.g.,  the 
effects  on earnings  from asset  divestiture--and  thus 
may provide  an artificially  optimistic  scenario. 
* Salomon  Brothers,  Money  Center  Banks:  Will  Canital 
Insufficiency  Pave the Way  for Mersers?  March  1991. 
12 In any event, while  some  combination  of these  stringent 
measures  appears  to be in prospect,  large  divestiture 
programs  seem likely  to play  central  roles.* 
The urgency  attaching  to these  adjustments  will 
increase  if requirements  for higher  capital  are 
implemented.  One recently  proposed.  by OTS  for thrifts 
applies  new guidelines  for  interest  rate  risk.  That  , 
measure  would  require  thrifts  to hold  added  capital 
equal to 50 percent  of the estimated  decline  in a 
firm's equity  resulting  from a 200 basis  point  adverse 
change  in interest  rates.  Such a requirement  seems 
likely to be applied  to banks  as well. 
An intriguing  implication  of these  pressures  on 
business  configuration  emerges  from the  shifting  of 
processing  from banks  to vendors.  There  would  appear 
to be a logical technological  progression  from  check 
*According  to Salomon,  during  the  last three  years 
employment  at money  center  banks  fell  104,000,  or 28%. 
13 processing to payments processing generally to direct 
involvement in the payments system and settlements.  A 
broad array of high-tech firms cannot fail to identify 
both direct and derivative business opportunities from 
bank outsourcing. 
E.  Resulatorv Policv  - 
Two elements of past regulatory oversight 
-. 
contributed to banks' current exposure to loss.  First, 
managers and owners were allowed to take excessive 
risks utilizing insured deposits.  This is often a Itgo 
for broke" strategy, although not always recognized at 
the time by managements.  Second, regulators had (and 
still have) incentives to forbear in dealing with 
undercapitalized and insolvent entities.  These reflect 
political pressures from Congress and the 
Administration, as well as aversion to an 
acknowledgement that taxpayer funds are at risk.  In 
short, regulatory forbearance--often couched in terms 
such as @@discretion"  and 11flexibilityV8--has 
accommodated the very risk-taking impulse for mangers 
that on average leads to huge losses. 
Three related actions are required to impose needed 
discipline on managers, owners, and regulators: 
14 (1) Commitment  to early and predictable  regulatory 
intervention  in the event of declining  capital; 
(2) a monitoring  system to provide  regulators  with 
adequate  information  on which  to base  intervention;  and 
(3) accountability  for follow-up  disclosure  by which 
the public  is able to judge.regulatory.performance 
against  the tougher policy.  \ 
The purpose  of early intervention  is to minimize 
the  likelihood  of losses to  insurance  funds  and 
(potentially)  to the public.  This would  be 
accomplished  by subjecting  managers  and  regulators  to 
binding  rules that discourage  managerial  end games  and 
regulatory  forbearance. 
The most  important of these  is to define  capital  as 
the difference  between  the market  value  of assets  and 
that  of liabilities  other than  subordinated  debt  and 
equity.  Economic values,  not historical  accounting 
values,  provide  the cushioning  function  required  of 
capital.  The use of market  valuations,  implemented  in 
a series  of transition  steps,  will  substantially 
enhance  the rigor of capital  discipline--on  managers  as 
well  as their regulators. 
This valuation  program would  be subject  to 
15 procedural  standards  and monitoring  by  internal  and 
external  overseers  (including  supervisory  agencies). 
It would augment  the role of bank examiners.  who  never 
seem to be able to catch up.  As a recent  GAO  study 
reported,  average  assets  including  those  "off-balance- 
sheet,"  adjusted  for inflation,  rose  14% per  annum 
between  1984 and 1989.  The examiner  force  rose  only ’ 
5%; thus activity  per examiner  increased  8% over  the 
period.* 
With a market-value  capital  program  in place, 
managers  should be able to engage  in whatever  functions 
they prefer so long as  (1) reasonable  valuations  are 
accessible,  and  (2) they are willing  to  face  any 
adverse  capital  consequences. 
The recent Administration  proposal  contains  a 
partial  implementation  of this program,  although  it is 
basically  inadequate.  It consists  of a system  of five 
grades  (or tranches)  linking  capital  positions  with 
degrees  of regulatory  oversight  and operating 
restrictions.  The greater  is capital,  the  less would 
be operating  constraints  on banks. 
*General Accounting  Office,  Denosit  Insurance, 
A Stratesv for Reform,  March  1991, p. 76. 
16 The Administration  program  is deficient  in two 
critical  respects.  First, it does  not require  that 
equity be measured  in terms of current  market 
valuations.  It is that element  of discipline--despite 
difficulties  of valuation  in some respects--that 
provide  the  insulation  against  taxpayer  loss.  Recent 
experience  clearly  demonstrates  the deficiencies  of  ’ 
historical  accounting  in that respect.  Second,  it 
accords banking  agencies  the latitude  to modify  or 
defer mandated  supervisory  action  against  capital 
deficient  banks  "if in the public  interest."  This  is 
an invitation  to problem  denial  or forbearance. 
The major  benefits  deriving  from a rigorous 
economic  capital  program  are three  in number.  First, 
more  conservative  behavior  by the regulated  and a 
clear-cut  responsibility  for action  on the part of 
regulators  would  be likely.  Second,  resolving  problem 
banks before  they reach economic  insolvency  would 
substantially  reduce  the need for insurance  reserves  of 
the kind maintained  heretofore--and  now  being 
replenished  by higher  deposit  insurance  premiums  and 
taxpayer  funds.  Third,  concerns  about  the connection 
between  broader  powers  and bank soundness  should  be 
largely eliminated. 
17 A counterpart  to expanded  operating  powers  for 
banks  is the ability of others  to engage  in banking. 
In light of the prospects  for greater  operational 
linkages  and given the considerable  incidence  of 
present  non-financial  ownership  in financial 
institutions,  continued  adherence  to the arbitrary 
distinction  between  banking  and commerce  is not  ’ 
realistic. 
Much  current  political  attention  is being  accorded 
not to fundamental  reform,  but to who  cleans  up the 
V*oldlq  mess  .  Politicians  are  intent  upon  devising  means 
that avoid  the appearance  of taxpayer  financial 
support.  The  fact is that  the taxpayers  are already 
committed  financially  to making  good  on past 
guarantees. 
The dilemma  of "who pays"  basically  constitutes 
efforts  by government  representatives  to avoid 
accountability  for a defective  system.  First,  federal 
deposit  insurance  was not designed  and has not been 
administered  as insurance  in the  formal  sense  of that 
term.  In the past  insuring  agencies  made  no effort  to 
diversify  risks;  indeed, there  waSno  effort  to 
ascertain  what diversification  would  entail.  Capital- 
impaired  institutions  have  not been  identified  and 
18 resolved  soon enough  to avoid  massive  losses  to agency. 
The  insurer, rather  than the  insured,  is the party  to 
file a claim  on the fund.  To repeat,  the  combination 
of inclusive  coverage  and resolution  delay  has 
encouraged  the weak  and the risk takers  to  increase 
risky positions. 
Second, coverage  has been  offered  at a uniform  price 
to all banks,  regardless  of riskiness. 
Third, the  insuring  agency  has covered  losses  not 
stipulated  in the contract--that  is, all  deposits  and 
some non-deposit  liabilities. 
Fourth, because  of the  large amounts  of prospective 
losses to the agency,  a sizable  co-insurance  cost--also 
not specified  in the  insurance  contract--may  be imposed 
on institutions  not guilty  of abusing  their  coverage. 
There  is a risk that an open-ended  put will  reduce  the 
availability  of new capital.  Furthermore,  at some 
point higher  deposit  premiums  will  provide  a sufficient 
incentive  for sound banks to shift activities  into 
nonbank vehicles. 
Finally,  the insuring  agency  is now  clearly  illiquid 
in addition  to being probably  insolvent.  That  is, it 
has a backlog  of institutions  requiring  resolution  for 
which  it has  insufficient  cash and marketable  assets. 
19 Even on the basis of booked  positions,  the 
deterioration  in finances  is clear.  In 1986  FDIC's 
cash  and governments  totaling  $16.5  billion  were  four 
times  its liabilities.  By June  1990  liquid  assets  were 
$10 billion,  only  1.6 times  liabilities.  The  liquidity 
problem  will  become much worse  even  if infusions 
replenish  the reserve  fund.  For instance,  if it is  ‘, 
assumed  losses to the fund approximate  $50 billion  over 
the next three  years,  and assuming  that  loss 
constitutes  20% of assets,  the volume  of assets  to be 
handled  would  approximate  $250 billion.  While  a 
portion  of that  is readily  marketable,  at  least half  is 
not and will  require  holding  prior  to  liquidation. 
E.  Conclusion 
The genesis  of banking  was  the facilitation  of 
saving  and payments.  Over  the years  these  services 
became  linked with an ever-broadening  range  of other 
services--notably  increasingly  varied  kinds  of credit 
intermediation-- which have  accorded  many  banks  the 
status  of department  stores  of financial  services.  In 
recent  years  the competitive  standing  of most  banks has 
eroded  because  of the proliferation  of alternative 
services  and portfolio  positioning  techniques  and also 
20 because of failures of adaptiveness by banks 
themselves.  While adaptiveness has been impeded by 
regulatory policies, those policies have not 
constrained institutions from embarking on highly risky 
strategies for survival. 
Virtually all services available from banks can be 
obtained from others.  Indeed, in the absence of banks, 
utility-type funds transfer and clearing services could 
readily be assumed by others.  Thus future banking 
prospects revolve around adaptiveness and regulatory 
reform. 
As now constituted, deposit assurance provides 
incentives  to managements to engage in risky bank end 
games.  These impulses will continue unless contained. 
They are contagious for the banking system overall in 
that survival odds for healthier institutions are 
reduced.  They do this by raising costs of current 
operations (especially  funding), spurring new pressures 
for regulatory constraints on operating latitude, and 
imposing ex-post cleanup costs. 
Adaptiveness in the future will entail for most 
narrower concentrations on selections from product, 
geographic, customer, and operating alternatives.  Some 
21 will benefit from narrower focus, but others will not 
survive.  The critical issue facing national banking 
policy now is how to develop a mechanism so that in the 
future services and institutions which are not needed 
will not have to be paid for by taxpayers.  Regulatory 
reform measures to accomplish this have been 
identified, but do not appear yet to be making much  ’ 
political progress with politicians or regulators. 
There is a risk to the public that muddling through or 
patchwork and ad hoc measures will suffice to avoid 
short-run drains on taxpayer resources.  These are not 
viable solutions, however, and the eventual consequence 
is likely to be a costly recurrence of the experience 
of the past decade. 
22 Table  1 
CLASSES  OF FINANCE-RELATED  SERVICES 
1.  Transactions 
a.  Funds transfers 
b.  Payments  processing 
:: 
Clearing 
Loan  servicing 
e.  Securities  purchases  and  sales 
f.  Foreign  exchange  purchases  and  sales 
2.  Investment  and Liquidity.Vehicles 
a.  Deposits 
i.  Immediately  transferable 
ii.  Term maturities 
b.  Direct  issues of fixed  income  instruments 
i.  Short-term  maturities 
ii.  Longer-term  maturities 
:: 
Equities 
Commingled  funds 
e.  Futures  and options 
f.  Swaps 
3.  Fund Raising 
:: 
Borrowing 
Equity  issuance 
C.  Facilitating 
i.  Origination 
ii.  Underwriting 
iii.  Distribution 
4.  Insurance 
:: 
Life 
Casualty 
:: 
Fidelity 
Credit  protection  or enhancement 
e.  Market  valuation 
i.  Interest  rate 
ii.  Foreign  exchange 
5.  Fiduciary 
a.  Investment  management 
b.  Trust 
:: 
Agency 
Safekeeping 
e.  Advice 1990  0.50%  7.84% 
1989  0.49  8.13 
1988  0.84  13.61 
1987  0.12  2.00 
1990  0.40%  7.83%  3.82% 
1989  0.10  2.20  3.12 
1988  0.97  20.58  2.96 
1987  -0.65  n.a.  3.47 
Table  2 
RECENT  COMMERCIAL  BANK  PERFORMANCE 
1987  -  1990 
(In  percent) 
Return  on  Return  on  Noncurrent  Loans  Equity  Capital 
Assets  Relative  to  Assets 
Banks  Losing 
Assets  Rates  Money 
All  Banks 
2.92%  6.47%  12.6% 
2.28  6.21  11.6 
2.14  6.28  13.9 
2.46  6.04  17.7 
Banks  With  Assets  Over  SlO  Billion 
5.26%  24.5% 
4.86  25.0 
5.10  2.6 
4.41  n.a. 
Source:  FDIC 